Alerts
Alerts
Zero-Day Tracker
Common Name:
Apple QuickTime RTSP Buffer Overflow
Date Disclosed:
11/23/2007
Date Patched:
12/13/2007
Vendor:
Apple
Application:
QuickTime 7.3 and earlier
Description:
A stack-based buffer overflow occurs when processing a malformed RTSP server response. If the attacker develops a malicious RTSP server that is able to deliver a very long 'Content-Type' field, the QuickTime client that connects to this server over the RTSP protocol can then be exploited. This process can be further "automated" by launching the attack from within an HTML file, which makes it easier to trick vulnerable users into connecting to a malicious RTSP server.
Severity:
High
Code Execution:
Yes
Impact:
Arbitrary code execution under the context of the logged in user
A client-side remote code execution vulnerability has a very high impact since the source of the malicious payload can be any site on the Internet. An even more critical problem is generated when clients are administrators on their local hosts, which would run the malicious payload with Administrator credentials.
The RTSP server can be hosted on any TCP port, which allows for firewalls to be circumvented by hosting the malicious RTSP server on TCP/80 (or another commonly unfiltered port).
Mitigation:
There is no known mitigation for blocking the exploitation of this vulnerability completely, however certain mitigation tactics may allow for attack vectors to be disrupted. These tactics are clearly spelled out in the referenced US-CERT advisory.
Protection:
APPLE-SA-2007-12-13 QuickTime 7.3.1
Links:
Original PoC (Crash)
Second PoC (Crash)
Third PoC (Crash)
US-CERT Advisory
Fourth PoC - Fully Functional Reverse Shell
Status:
Nov 23, 2007: Original PoC Disclosure
Nov 26, 2007: Fully Functional Exploit Released
Common Name:
Apple QuickTime RTSP Buffer Overflow
Date Disclosed:
11/23/2007
Date Patched:
12/13/2007
Vendor:
Apple
Application:
QuickTime 7.3 and earlier
Description:
A stack-based buffer overflow occurs when processing a malformed RTSP server response. If the attacker develops a malicious RTSP server that is able to deliver a very long 'Content-Type' field, the QuickTime client that connects to this server over the RTSP protocol can then be exploited. This process can be further "automated" by launching the attack from within an HTML file, which makes it easier to trick vulnerable users into connecting to a malicious RTSP server.
Severity:
High
Code Execution:
Yes
Impact:
Arbitrary code execution under the context of the logged in user
A client-side remote code execution vulnerability has a very high impact since the source of the malicious payload can be any site on the Internet. An even more critical problem is generated when clients are administrators on their local hosts, which would run the malicious payload with Administrator credentials.
The RTSP server can be hosted on any TCP port, which allows for firewalls to be circumvented by hosting the malicious RTSP server on TCP/80 (or another commonly unfiltered port).
Mitigation:
There is no known mitigation for blocking the exploitation of this vulnerability completely, however certain mitigation tactics may allow for attack vectors to be disrupted. These tactics are clearly spelled out in the referenced US-CERT advisory.
Protection:
- eEye's Blink® Personal Edition protects from this vulnerability.
- eEye's Blink® Professional Edition protects from this vulnerability.
- eEye's Retina® Network Security Scanner scans devices to detect for this vulnerability.
APPLE-SA-2007-12-13 QuickTime 7.3.1
Links:
Original PoC (Crash)
Second PoC (Crash)
Third PoC (Crash)
US-CERT Advisory
Fourth PoC - Fully Functional Reverse Shell
Status:
Nov 23, 2007: Original PoC Disclosure
Nov 26, 2007: Fully Functional Exploit Released
