Alerts
Alerts
Zero-Day Tracker
Common Name:
Apple QuickTime RTSP URL Buffer Overflow
Date Disclosed:
Jan 1, 2007
Date Patched:
Jan 23, 2007
Vendor:
Apple
Application:
QuickTime 7.1.3 and earlier
Description:
A stack-based buffer overflow occurs when processing a long rtsp:// URL within a QTL file, which is an XML document laid out like the following, according to the published proof-of-concept:
<?xml version="1.0"?>
<?quicktime type="application/x-quicktime-media-link"?>
<embed
autoplay="true"
moviename="A"
src="rtsp://A:[258 or more characters]" />
This malicious QTL file may be hosted on a web site, allowing for exploitation across the internet. Other attack vectors may be possible to reach the same vulnerable code in QuickTime which may require less user interaction than this published proof-of-concept.
Severity:
High
Code Execution:
Yes
Impact:
Arbitrary code execution under the context of the logged in user
A client-side remote code execution vulnerability has a very high impact since the source of the malicious payload can be any site on the Internet. An even more critical problem is generated when clients are administrators on their local hosts, which would run the malicious payload with Administrator credentials.
Mitigation:
A vendor-supplied patch is available and is the best form of mitigation for this vulnerability.
Previous Mitigation Information
To block the published proof-of-concept using other mitigation, users are suggested to disassociate QTL files from QuickTime. This can be accomplished via the registry, by editing the (default) key in HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\.qtl. Simply adding a ".bak" will disable QuickTime from opening QTL files. This mitigation will only protect from the QTL-file vector, which is the only published attack vector.
NOTE: Although some sources have suggested disabling RTSP within QuickTime, this does not effectively stop the proof-of-concept exploit.
Protection:
Security Update 2007-001
Links:
Original Disclosure (MoAB-01-01-2007)
PoC Code Disclosure - Mac (Non-Malicious Exploit)
CVE-2007-0015
PoC Code Disclosure - Windows (BindShell TCP/4444)
Status:
January 1, 2007: Original Advisory and POC Disclosure
January 23, 2007: Vendor Patch Release
Common Name:
Apple QuickTime RTSP URL Buffer Overflow
Date Disclosed:
Jan 1, 2007
Date Patched:
Jan 23, 2007
Vendor:
Apple
Application:
QuickTime 7.1.3 and earlier
Description:
A stack-based buffer overflow occurs when processing a long rtsp:// URL within a QTL file, which is an XML document laid out like the following, according to the published proof-of-concept:
<?xml version="1.0"?>
<?quicktime type="application/x-quicktime-media-link"?>
<embed
autoplay="true"
moviename="A"
src="rtsp://A:[258 or more characters]" />
This malicious QTL file may be hosted on a web site, allowing for exploitation across the internet. Other attack vectors may be possible to reach the same vulnerable code in QuickTime which may require less user interaction than this published proof-of-concept.
Severity:
High
Code Execution:
Yes
Impact:
Arbitrary code execution under the context of the logged in user
A client-side remote code execution vulnerability has a very high impact since the source of the malicious payload can be any site on the Internet. An even more critical problem is generated when clients are administrators on their local hosts, which would run the malicious payload with Administrator credentials.
Mitigation:
A vendor-supplied patch is available and is the best form of mitigation for this vulnerability.
Previous Mitigation Information
To block the published proof-of-concept using other mitigation, users are suggested to disassociate QTL files from QuickTime. This can be accomplished via the registry, by editing the (default) key in HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\.qtl. Simply adding a ".bak" will disable QuickTime from opening QTL files. This mitigation will only protect from the QTL-file vector, which is the only published attack vector.
NOTE: Although some sources have suggested disabling RTSP within QuickTime, this does not effectively stop the proof-of-concept exploit.
Protection:
- eEye's Blink® Personal Edition protects from this vulnerability.
- eEye's Blink® Professional Edition protects from this vulnerability.
Security Update 2007-001
Links:
Original Disclosure (MoAB-01-01-2007)
PoC Code Disclosure - Mac (Non-Malicious Exploit)
CVE-2007-0015
PoC Code Disclosure - Windows (BindShell TCP/4444)
Status:
January 1, 2007: Original Advisory and POC Disclosure
January 23, 2007: Vendor Patch Release
